Every organization owes its Internet connectivity to one protocol: BGP4. There are no alternatives. BGP4 has longstanding vulnerabilities that cannot be fixed, and can only be monitored carefully.
Two key points:
1. Everyone who connects to the Internet is currently exposed to various routing risks: downtime, hijacking and now even wholesale traffic interception.
2. Very few people understand these risks, so they are not being measured or managed appropriately.
Basics of routing and the inherent threats:
-Vulnerabilities & typical historical attacks
Internet Routing – Prefixes
-Internet routing is orchestrated via blocks of IP addresses.
-A network prefix is a block of contiguous IP addresses.
-IP addresses in the same prefix are routed in the same way.
Internet Routing – ASNs
Global Internet routing relies on the Border Gateway Protocol. Each organization participating in BGP is assigned:
-A unique Autonomous System Number or ASN (integer)
-One or more prefixes (range of IP addresses)
-All routing decisions are local
BGP Update Messages
-An UPDATE message announces a new route or withdraws a previously announced route. UPDATE = prefix + route attributes
-Adjacent routers chatter constantly with each other as routes come and go. Globally, Renesys observes 45,000+ updates per minute when things are quiet!
Routing announcements have attributes and many possibilities but the (hopefully valid) "AS" path to the announced prefix is always present.
1. No single authoritative source of who should be doing what.
-If there were, you could filter out the errors / hijacks.
-As a result, filtering by ISPs is not common or easy.
2. All of Internet routing is based on trust.
-Anyone can announce any IP space they want.
-Anyone can prepend any ASN to any path that they want.
3. No mechanism in place to handle ASNs who go rogue. There are no Internet police!
Two typical types of hijacks:
No operational impact
-Hijack unused (but maybe assigned) IP space
-Potentially harms the reputation of the owner
-But does not disrupt any legitimate traffic on the Internet
-DoD owns but does not announce 18.104.22.168/8, 22.214.171.124/8, 126.96.36.199/8 and others. These networks
are “free for the taking” without any impact on DoD. Every announcement in this space is a hijack.
Obvious operational impact
-Hijack currently used IP space
-Legitimate traffic diverted to the hijacker
-Victim can be effectively taken off the Internet
-Very disruptive and very obvious
-YouTube owns 188.8.131.52/22 (Feb 2008)
This contains the more-specific 184.108.40.206/24
The above /24 used to contain all of YouTube’s
DNS Servers (have since moved)
Web Servers (have since added additional IP space)
YouTube announced only the /22
-Pakistan Telecom announces the /24
In BGP, most specific route to an IP address wins!
Pakistan Telecom gets all traffic intended for YouTube
YouTube is globally unreachable for 2 hours
Both types of hijack allow an attacker to attract all traffic bound for the hijacked space.
-Hijacking has been going on for over 10 years!
-No incremental or comprehensive solutions
-Solutions lack economic drivers
-Doesn’t happen daily and universally
-Avoiding negative publicity is not necessarily compelling
-Impact poorly understood by management
-Miscreants are actively hijacking now
-To send spam from “clean” IP blocks
-To cover their other nefarious activities
-What good are your firewall/IDS logs now?
-Need historical global routing data to identify hijackers
-Review the MITM exploit presented at DEFCON 16 (August 10, 2008)
-AS path attribute
-AS loop prevention
-MITM attack technique
-Obscuring the MITM attack with TTL adjustment
How can the victim observe this?
-Victim’s routes and those of at least one provider will look normal
-Traceroute from a public looking glass to the victim’s IPs will show the hijacker
(assuming the looking glass hasn’t been blinded to the attack).
-Traceroute depends on incrementally increasing TTLs
-Hijacker can hide his presence by silently increasing TTLs for packets intended for the victim
-Hides hijacker’s routers
-Hides hijacker’s outbound routes to victim
Detecting the Attack
-Is this generally visible?
-Difficulties with detection
-You know the correct routing policies (easy)
-Generally limited to networks under your control
-Review of available alarm services
-Can you attack the alarm services?
-You don’t know the routing policies (hard)
-A proposed global detection technique
Difficulties in observing the MITM attack
-Most Internet routers will see and prefer the hijacked routes. Won’t be obvious among their
-Traceroutes won’t show the hijacking (with TTL adjustments). Independent of source location.
-Latency to the victim will increase. Could be slight if the hijacker isn’t far from the victim.
-Route alarming services might see this if AS loop detection is disabled.
Two simple questions:
Can I detect MITM for my network?
-Easy: Routing policy is presumably known or at least knowable.
Can I detect MITM for the Internet at large?
-Much harder: Routing policies are not known and probably unknowable for all 270,000+ prefixes